LEGAL SANCTITY OF TARIFFS UNDER COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Abstract

Tariffs remain one of the most legally significant instruments of state control over cross-border commerce. Although modern trade discourse often characterizes tariffs as economically distortive or politically regressive, positive law does not treat them as inherently illegitimate. On the contrary, tariffs occupy a recognized position within domestic constitutional orders, statutory customs frameworks, and international trade law. This article examines the legal sanctity of tariffs under comparative and international law and argues that tariffs derive legitimacy not from unrestricted sovereignty, but from lawful authority exercised within a layered normative framework. At the domestic level, tariff power must be traceable to constitutional allocation, statutory delegation, or treaty-based institutional competence. At the international level, tariffs must conform to multilateral disciplines, especially boundrate commitments and non-discrimination norms under the GATT/WTO framework, unless justified through recognized exceptions or trade-remedy regimes. Through a comparative analysis of the United States, the European Union, and India, this article demonstrates that distinct legal systems validate tariff power through different institutional pathways while reaching a common conclusion: tariffs are legitimate when imposed through law. The article also examines anti-dumping duties, safeguard measures, national security-based trade restrictions, and trade restrictions linked to the United Nations Charter. It concludes that the true legal sanctity of tariffs lies in their character as rule-governed instruments of public authority.