DELEGATED DIGITAL POWER AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA AND CANADA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.67874/ijlcs.97Keywords:
Separation of powers, Delegated legislation, Digital regulation, Data protection, Cyber Security, Platform regulation, Nigeria, CanadaAbstract
Digital transformation has changed how public power is distributed among the institutions of government. Legislatures increasingly enact framework statutes that delegate substantial rule-making, investigative and enforcement authority to ministers, regulators and specialised agencies. This raises the research problem addressed in this article: how much law-making power may be transferred from the legislature to executive and regulatory bodies in the digital field without undermining the separation of powers and constitutional accountability? The article has three objectives: to identify the risks that the lengthening regulatory chain of the digital state poses to the separation of powers; to compare how two federations with different constitutional structures, presidential Nigeria and parliamentary Canada, manage those risks; and to propose a framework for assessing delegated digital power in both. Methodologically, it combines doctrinal analysis of constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations and case law with a functional comparative method. It examines the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 and the Nigeria Data Protection Commission, the 2022 platform Code of Practice of the National Information Technology Development Agency, the suspension of Twitter in 2021, and Canada’s telecommunications, privacy and broadcasting regimes, including its cyber security legislation, which received Royal Assent in June 2026. The article argues that digital regulation does not eliminate the separation of powers but changes its institutional expression. It finds that Nigeria’s formal separation of legislative and executive power has not prevented rights-sensitive digital rules from being made by executive action and agency codes, while Canada’s acceptance of broad delegation is tempered by prepublication, parliamentary scrutiny and reasonableness review. It proposes an authority–standards–accountability framework and a model of ‘bounded digital delegation’ that distinguishes technical from normative discretion.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Dr. Emmanuel Ojotu (Author)

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