THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE: WHITHER NIGERIA?

Abstract

Legislative oversight is the principal mechanism through which an elected assembly holds the executive to account, and it is a practical expression of separation of powers in a constitutional democracy. This paper examines legislative oversight in Nigeria under the 1999 Constitution, using the AIRAC method to state issues, rules, their application, and the conclusions that follow. It pursues four objectives, namely to examine the constitutional and legal foundation of legislative oversight in Nigeria, to analyse the nature, scope and limits of its oversight powers, to assess how effectively the legislature has exercised those functions, and to identify the factors constraining effective oversight. The paper adopts separation of powers, checks and balances, and principal agent theory as its framework, treating the legislature as agent of the electorate and monitor of the executive. Methodologically, it relies on a doctrinal legal research design, drawing its population and sample from the Constitution, statutes, decided cases, official reports and scholarly literature, selected through purposive sampling, and analysed through qualitative content and case analysis, with reliability and validity secured through triangulation of legal sources. The findings show that although Sections 88 and 89 confer wide investigative and financial oversight powers on the National Assembly, executive dominance, weak enforcement, partisan politics, judicial caution and institutional capacity gaps have blunted the practical effectiveness of oversight. The paper recommends judicial clarification of Sections 88 and 89, statutory strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, and reform of the committee system.